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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-THE FUENTES CASE:
SNIADACH MADE CLEAR
On June 6, 1969, Margarita Fuentes walked into the offices of the
Greater Miami Legal Services Program seeking legal assistance,' having
been a recent victim of the Florida replevin statutes. 2 She had purchased a gas stove and a service policy from the Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. under a conditional sales contract calling for monthly payments over
a period of time. A few months later she also purchased a stereo set
under the same sort of contract, providing for "repossession" upon default. These accounts were consolidated giving her a balance due of
approximately $500.00 for the two items plus an additional $100.00
financing charge. Subsequent to her purchases, Ms. Fuentes discovered
that her new stove leaked gas. Under her service policy, she complained
to Firestone, but they allegedly never put it in satisfactory working condition. During the first year Ms. Fuentes had diligently made her installment payments, but stopped doing so when the dispute developed over the
stove. After investigating Ms. Fuentes' claim, and acting in the belief that
she had a meritorious defense to any action by Firestone, the attorneys at
the Legal Services Offices advised her not to resume payments. No further
action was taken by either party until September 15, 1969, when Firestone filed in the Small Claims Court in Dade County, Florida for a writ
of replevin. 3 Ms. Fuentes first became aware of the claim against her
when a deputy sheriff came to her door and demanded delivery of the
stove and stereo. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Fuentes instituted an action in
1. For a discussion of how legal aid lawyers used Ms. Fuentes' problem as a
test case, see Abbott and Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test
Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IowA L. REv. 955, 959 (1972).
2. The relevant Florida statutory provisions are as follows: Right to Replevin:
"Any person, when goods or chattels may be wrongfully detained by any other
person or officer, may have . . . a writ of replevin for the recovery thereof and
[any] . . . damages sustained by reason of the wrongful caption or detention. Or
such person may ... institute an action seeking like relief, but with summons to the
defendant instead of [replevy] writ, . . . in which event no bond shall be required
of him, and seizure of the property involved shall be seized only after judgment, such judgment to be in like form and tenor as that provided for when defendant shall have retaken the property upon forthcoming bond ....... FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 78.01 (1964); Bond Requisites: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (1964). The plaintiff must file a bond in double the value of the property sought to be replevied.
3. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (1964), supra note 2.
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federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Florida prejudgement replevin procedures under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A three judge district court found for the defendant
4
Firestone and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
On September 18, 1970, a similar action was commenced in a federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
Replevin Procedure. 5 As was the case in the Florida challenge, a three
judge district court panel upheld the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
prejudgment writ of replevin. 6
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judg7
ments of both district courts and remanded the cases. In a 4-3 decision,
the Court struck down the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania
and, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, held that these statutes violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in that they failed to
provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard before persons
were deprived of their property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
The immediate significance of the Fuentes opinion is that it has succinctly enunciated that the right to a hearing prior to deprivation
of property is a requisite to due process as applied to the states under the
fourteenth amendment, and has clearly shown that the Court does not
limit the fourteenth amendment's "protection of property" to a particular
class of property, but applies the due process clause to "any significant
taking of property."' 8 The opinion in effect gives focus to a blurry picture of procedural due process that has perplexed the courts since the
landmark Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.0 case was handed down by
4.
5.

Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
The procedural requisites for a prejudgment writ of replevin are set out in
the PA. RULES OF CIV. PRO. Rule 1073.
6. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
7. The ruling was made by a seven member court since Justices Powell and
Rehnquist were not sitting when the arguments were heard. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackman and White dissented from the 4-3 opinion. It is arguable
whether the decision would have been the same if the full Court had decided the
case.

8. 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
9. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment of wages procedure, providing no notice or prior hearing
held violative of procedural due process). For a discussion of the case, see Kennedy,
Due Process Limitations on Creditors' remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 158 (1970); Note, Some Implications of
Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1970); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to
Judgment is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for
Related Areas of the Law, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 986 (1970); see also cases cited infra
notes 28 and 29.
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the Supreme Court in 1969. Also of immediate impact is the fact that
prejudgment replevin statutes throughout the states may be subjected to
scrutiny by the courts in light of the constitutional requirements of Fuentes.10 The underlying and more pervasive significance of Fuentes
is that it poses a threat to a vast array of other prejudgment remedies 1
that may not measure up to due process requirements as set forth therein
by the Supreme Court.
The purpose of this case note is to examine the growth and extension
of due process as applied to the protection of property in the wake of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'1 2 and to discuss the clarification of
the due process standard made in Fuentes. The impact of Fuentes on
existing replevin procedures and other prejudgment remedies that do not
measure up to the clarified standard of due process will also be considered.
At first glance, it may appear unseemly that the United States Supreme
Court should declare such a deeply entrenched procedure as replevin to
be unconstitutional in terms of due process. After all, writs of replevin
originated some 700 years ago with the Statutes of Marlbridge 1 3 and
Westminster.' 4 At that time, the writ was used to seize property that was
wrongfully taken in the first instance. 5 Where a claim was made for
chattels unlawfully detained, though not unlawfully taken, the common
law action for obtaining possession was detinue, not replevin.' 6 Detinue, however, was an action that commanded the defendant to appear
and give his reasons why the property should not be delivered to the
claimant. 17 At common law the defendant would thus be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard.
Today, most states have on their books prejudgment replevin statutes
whereby a person may seek a writ if his goods are "wrongfully detained," 8 not requiring that the goods be wrongfully taken as in common
10. The National Legal Aid and Defenders Association researched pertinent
state statutes and found that in the District of Columbia and in every state, with the
exception of Delaware and Kentucky, there exists some form of prejudgment replevin statute. Abbott and Peters, supra note 1, at 964 n.33.
11. For examples of the types of actions which may be furthered by Fuentes, see
cases cited infra notes 28-29, 51-54.
12. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13. 52 HEN.3, c.21 (1267).
14. 3 EDW. 1, c. 17 (1275).
15. Maitland, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 48 (1936).
16. Shipman, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADINGS 120 (3d ed. 1923).
17. Id. at 118.

18.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).

replevin statute see FLA.

STAT. ANN. §

For an example of a typical

78.01 (1964), set out supra note 2.
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A close examination of these statutes will show that the

only requirement for obtaining such a writ is the posting of a bond and
filing of an affidavit.' 0 "There is no judicial interposition between the
plaintiff's affidavit and the ministerial act of issuing the writ; the defendant has no opportunity to prevent the taking once the machinery has been
set in motion."' 20 Under these modern replevin statutes there is nothing
an individual can do to prevent the initial seizure of his property since
he is not aware of the writ until the sheriff knocks at his door to retrieve
the goods.
In 1896, the Supreme Court recognized that "[w]herever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend .
,21 The
"...
Court has thus long recognized that due process of law requires an opportunity to be heard. 22 The resulting doctrine-that the opportunity
to be heard prior to deprivation of property is a fundamental requisite

of due process-has been continuously upheld by the Court.23
The Court has recognized, however, that under certain extraordinary
circumstances a hearing may be postponed until after the seizure of the
individual's property in a situation requiring special protection for a state's
or a creditor's interest.24
19. In every jurisdiction with a prejudgment replevin procedure the plaintiff is
required to file a bond in support of his claim, usually double the amount of the
property. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.08 (1964).
Likewise in most jurisdictions a defendant may post a bond and reacquire the property pending the outcome of the litigation if he does so within a certain time period. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 78.13 (1964) (3 days).
However in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont there are no statutory provisions permitting defendants to reacquire the property before judgment.
20. Abbott and Peters, supra note 1, at 962.
21. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) (barring owner of real
property from appearing in confiscation proceeding was unconstitutional).
22. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (due process requires appropriate service of process).
23. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971) (suspension of drivers license of uninsured motorist after accident prior to hearing violates due process); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (due process prohibits a
state from denying indigents access to its courts to dissolve their marriage solely
because of inability to pay court fees); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970)
(due process requires a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (due process prohibits
prejudgment garnishment of wages); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)
(failure to give petitioner notice of pending adoption proceeding was violative of
due process); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13
(1950) (notice must be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to be heard).
24. See, e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961) (summary exclusion from government property without a hearing upheld
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Although the Court had established the requisites of due process over
the years, it was not until 1969, when the Court handed down its opinion
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,25 that the Court truly began to

broaden the scope of due process protection. In this decision, the Court
held that the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment procedure violated the
fundamental principles of due process. Never before had the Court held
that due process requires a prior hearing even when the restrictions on
the use of the property are relatively brief and an eventual hearing is
guaranteed. 26 In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas carefully characterized the case as dealing with "wages-a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system."' 27 It was this particular characterization that brought about the different interpretations of
Sniadach that were to follow. Many courts looked upon Sniadach as a
constitutional basis for the extension of due process,2 8 while other courts
when activities were of a highly classified nature); Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs dangerous to public
health without a prior hearing sustained); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947)
(Federal Home Loan Bank's appointment of conservator to take charge of the affairs
of a loan association without holding a hearing did not violate due process); Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (rent controls established in defense rental areas
without landlord, hearing upheld); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)
(maximum rate for beef sale during war without hearing for sellers sustained).
See also Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (foreign attachment law requiring
the defendant to first post a bond before contesting the action upheld).
25. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
26. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 60, 113 (1969).
27. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
28. See, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (repossession
under UCC without prior hearing denies due process); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing
and Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (dicta indicating that attachment not sufficiently drawn to protect valid state or creditor interest under Sniadach); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (invalidating sale
under distraint procedures which failed to provide hearing prior to dispossession);
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (re.
plevin statute held violative of due process); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109,
122-24 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper lien law without provision for prior hearing
held violative of due process); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
aII'd 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (voiding entry of judgment by confession against debtors
who lacked adequate understanding of their contracts); Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz.
App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969) (garnishment of accounts receivable denies due
process); Randone v. App. Dep't of Superior Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d
536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971) (summary attachment of property denies due process); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971) (distress warrant proceeding permitting household furniture to be remade without
notice and hearing denies due process); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services,
Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (prejudgment impounding of businessman's accounts receivable denies due process); McConaghley v. City of New York,
60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (unilateral determination in
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read Sniadach as restricted to protection of a particular class of property. 29 In effect, two very important questions were left open by Sniadach: (1) is property other than wages covered by the rationale of the
decision, and (2) what kind of "hearing" will be required to satisfy due

process?
Considering the first question, it becomes clear in Fuentes that the
Court never intended to restrict their reasoning in Sniadach to wages
alone: "While Sniadach . . emphasized the special importance of
wages ... , [it] did not convert that emphasis into a new and more limited constitutional doctrine."'3 0 The Court stressed that the district courts
that heard Fuentes and Epps based their decisions on a very narrow read-

ing of Sniadach.
Though the Court recognized that there are gradations of "importance" and "necessity" of various consumer goods3 l it went on to say:
[I]f
the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with objectivity, it
cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property'
generally. And, under our enterprise system, an individual's choices in the marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to someone else. It is not the
business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own critical evaluation
of those choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights are 'necessary.' 3 2

The Court therefore makes it clear that the due process standard is to be
applied across the board and equally to all classes of property.
The question of what type of "hearing" will satisfy due process was
discussed in Fuentes, but not fully resolved. The Court was cautious in
public hospital regarding patient's ability to pay held to deny due process); Larson
v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (garnishment of bank accounts denies due process).
29. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J. and P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.
1970); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black
Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); America Olean
Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley,
309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa
County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (attachment upheld); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1965) (prejudgment garnishment of
bank account by process of foreign attachment held constitutional); Robinson v.
Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1970) (ex parte attachment of
non-residents' real property); 300 West 154th St. Realty Co. v. Dep't of Bldgs.,
26 N.Y.2d 538, 260 N.E.2d 534 (1970) (procedure which did not require that
landlord be given judicial determination of liability for repairs before his tenants
were asked to make payments due from them on rent directly to Board of Health to
pay for such repairs).
30. 407 U.S. 67, 89 (1972).
31. Id. at 89.
32. Id. at 90.
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this regard, and was reluctant to take on a task that it felt should be left
to the legislatures:
The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many
potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation-not adjudication.83

Though the form of the "hearing" was not specified in the decision, the
importance of the timeliness of such prior hearings was emphasized. In
discussing the cases which had been brought before the Court, it was said:
The primary question in the present cases is whether these state statutes are consitutionally defective in failing to provide for hearings 'at a meaningful time.' 34
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it
must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented.35 (Emphasis
added.)

Considering the facts of the instant case, it is easy to see how the statutes in question did not measure up to the due process standard, in light
of the fact that the parties did not know of the actions against them until
the sheriff came to replevy the goods. A hearing prior to such depriva36
tion of property is a requisite of due process.
In other recent decisions of the Court, the importance of a hearing at
a "meaningful time" has been stressed. In Goldberg v. Kelly,37 the Court
struck down a statutory scheme permitting suspension of welfare benefits
prior to a hearing, while in Bell v. Burson, 8 the Court held that state
provisions permitting the suspension of the driver's license of an uninsured motorist, after an accident but prior to a hearing on the motorist's
liability, was a denial of due process of law. In this past term of the
Court, and prior to the Fuentes decision's emphasis on the "prior hearing" requisite for due process, the Court handed down a decision in Stanley v. Illinois3 9 which held that fathers of illegitimate children are entitled to prior notice of adoption proceedings. The constitutional requirement that "notice" and "an opportunity to be heard" be provided at a
"meaningful time" seeks to protect persons against arbitrary deprivations.
The rationale of the Court is that "when a person has an opportunity to
33. Id. at 96-97; The Court went on to say: "Leeway remains to develop a
form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the
fairness and effectiveness of the hearing in preventing seizures of goods where the
party seeking the writ has little probability of succeeding on the merits of the dispute." Id. at 97 n.33.
34. Id. at 80.
35. Id. at 81.
36. Id.
37. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
38. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
39. 405 U.S. 645 (1972); for a discussion of the case see Note, 21 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1036 (1972).
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speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he
has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented. ' 40 This rationale is explicit in Fuentes,
though it appears that it is the same reasoning that the Court used in
Sniadach and subsequent decisions in formulating the standards for due
process.
In light of the clarification of the due process standard that applies to
deprivations of "significant property interests," it should be made clear
that this is not an absolute standard. As noted by the Court, the requirement of a hearing prior to deprivation does not apply in certain "extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake
' 41
that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."
These extraordinary situations are not the only exceptions to the requirement of a prior hearing. Although not stated explicitly in the
Fuentes decision, it would appear from certain language included in
the opinion that one may waive his constitutional right to a prior hearing if it is done "voluntarily . . . and knowingly."' 42 In this regard the
majority mentioned the case of D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,43 where
"the Court recently outlined considerations relevant to the determination
of a contractual waiver of due process rights."'44 In Overmyer, two corporations specifically bargained for, and included in their contract, a confession of judgment provision. The Court held that since the Overmyer
Company, for consideration and with full awareness of the legal consequences, waived its rights to prejudgment notice and hearing, there was
no deprivation of its fourteenth amendment rights.4 5 However, the Court
noted that "where [a] contract is one of adhesion, where there is great
disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for
46
the [waiver] provisions, other legal consequences may ensue."1
It may be inferred, then, from a reading of the Fuentes case in light of
of Overmyer that the right to a hearing prior to deprivation of property may indeed be waived if such waiver is made explicitly, voluntarily,
and knowingly. The Court made clear in Fuentes, however, that although the contracts in that case may have provided for "repossession,"
40. 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
41. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); for other cases that
exemplify extraordinarysituations,see supra note 22.
42. 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
43. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
44. 407 U.S. at 94.
45. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
46. Id. at 188.
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they involved no waiver of constitutional rights. 4T The contracts gave the
creditors the right to repossess, but did not specify how the repossession
would take place. In the absence of a clear waiver, the Court felt that
the constitutional rights were still intact. It is of interest that the three
judge panel that initially heard the Fuentes case 48 reasoned that since Ms.
Fuentes admitted non-payment, she could not complain of a lack of hearing since she had agreed to the consequence of repossession in the event
of a default on the contract. The lower court simply failed to distinguish
between the rights the creditor acquired by the contract and the pre-imminent right of Ms. Fuentes to due process notice before any deprivation
could take place.
Considering the broadened due process standard enunciated in Fuentes, the impact of the decision should be considerable despite its limitations. It would appear that very much like Sniadach, the Fuentes decision will provide a basis for constitutional challenges to existing replevin
statutes and other prejudgement remedies that do not provide the modicum of fairness dictated by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Where these constitutional challenges will be launched will
depend greatly on how the legislatures of the various states have constructed their statutes. Those statutes that provide for a fair hearing at
a "meaningful time" should meet the constitutional standard; but the due
process requisites of Fuentes may well cause the demise of remedies that
do not pass constitutional muster.
Even provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code will have to yield
if they do not measure up to the constitutional requirements of due process. 49 In apparent conflict with the present case is § 9-503 of the Code
providing for repossession in secured transactions. It provides that:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of peace or may proceed by action .... 50

Though the right of the secured party to repossess cannot be called into
question, how he goes about it must, under the present decision, comply
with due process standards. In California, a United States District Court 5'
47. 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
48. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
See Swygert, Secured Transactions in Revised Article Nine, 22 DEPAUL L.
(1972); Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Deficiency-A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Solution, 51 ORE. L. REV. 301, 330 (1972).
50. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 (1972).
49.

REV.

-

51. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). But see Oiler v.
Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors,
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recognized this constitutional conflict, even before Fuentes was handed
down, basing its decision on a perceptive reading of Sniadach.
Cases such as Adams v. Egley, 52 the aforementioned California case,
which deal with prejudgment remedies that do not afford prior hearings,
may well be filling the dockets of our courts in the wake of Fuentes. Already Fuentes has been cited in striking down the replevin statute of New
Mexico,53 prejudgment attachment of automobiles in Washington, 54 and
replevy of machinery and equipment under New York's Replevin Statute.5 5

The impact of Fuentes has also been felt in Illinois, where the

Secretary of State imposed new restrictions on repossession of automobiles. 56 Under the reform, anyone who repossesses a car must notify the
person from whom it was repossessed that he has a right to present a legal
defense before a new title may be obtained. This is significant since in
Illinois, a car cannot be resold until the dealer has clear title. In Cook
County, Illinois, the Clerk of the Circuit Court has been apprised of the
constitutional standards of Fuentes, and has abolished the routine issu-

ance of writs of replevin. 57 Under the reform imposed by the Clerk, an
individual is now entitled to a court hearing before sheriff's police are
ordered to seize his property.
Though Fuentes lays a broad base for the extension of due process pro-

tection, one must be careful not to stretch the opinion beyond its bounds.
The Court itself points out that the holding is a narrow one and goes on
to say:
We do not question the power of a state to seize goods before a final judgment to
protect the security interests of creditors so long as those creditors have tested their
58
claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing.
Inc., 41 U.S.L.W. 2211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 1972); Kirksey v. Thelig, 41
U.S.L.W. 2325 (USDC, Colorado 1972).
52. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
53. Solomon Sena v. Montoya, United States District Court N.M., No. 9296,
July 21, 1972, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONs GUIDE 51885 (1972).
54. Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt, Wash. Ct. of Appeals, No. 1496-1, July 3,
1972, CCH SECURED TRANSAciONs GUIDE 51891 (1972); for additional examples
of summary attachment statutes that have been struck down in the wake of Fuentes,
see Hall v. Garson, 41 U.S.L.W. 2249 (U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 5th Cir. Nov. 2, 1972);
Gross v. Fox, 41 U.S.L.W. 2246 (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1970); Etheridge
v. Bradley, 41 U.S.L.W. 2247 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 1972).
55. Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v. William Haenelt, d/b/a G & H Engineering, New York Sup. Ct., App. Div., ed. Jud. Dept. No. 18,545, June 29, 1972, CCH
SECURED

TRANSACTIONs GUIDE

51859 (1972).

56. Chicago Daily News Aug. 5-6, 1972, at 29. A case is now pending in federal district court that challenges the Illinois UCC repossession provisions,
Mojica v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 72 C 686 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
57. Chicago Daily News, supra note 56, at 29.
58. 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
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The Court apparently does not seek to whittle away at the creditor's remedies, but simply to see that the debtor is not deprived unjustly.
In the context of Fuentes, the Court has imposed a constitutional
standard of "fairness" on the debtor-creditor relationship. This standard
may ultimately increase the cost of credit to the same consumer to whom
the Court is extending the arm of due process. Whether or not the benefits of the present decision will prove to outweigh the possible costs remains to be seen.
Elliott D. Hartstein

